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AFGHAN MIGRATORY STRATEGIES AND THE THREE
SOLUTIONS TO THE REFUGEE PROBLEM
Dr Alessandro Monsutti*
The present article proposes three main theses: the normality of movements and the
prior existence of transnational networks in and around Afghanistan; the resilience
and inventiveness of the Afghan population, especially illustrated by the remittance
system; the relevance of migratory movements and of transnational networks for
the reconstruction of the country and the stability of the region. In contrast to the
migratory strategies developed by the refugees, the three solutions to the problem of the
refugees promoted by the UNHCR (voluntary repatriation in the country of origin;
integration in the host country; resettlement in a third country) are based on the idea
that solutions are found when movements stop. But mobility may be seen as a key
livelihood strategy. A more comprehensive solution is needed, which takes into
account the full range of strategies and responses developed by the Afghan population,
including the back-and-forth movements between Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and
beyond.
1. The normality of movement
The present article is based on data collected since the mid-1990s in Afghanistan,
Pakistan and Iran, and then in Western countries, especially among the Hazaras, a
marginal group originating in the centre of Afghanistan.1 Beyond some specificity,
their migratory networks express some more widespread social features and reflect
old patterns of mobility.
Afghans give different and usually plural reasons for their decision to
migrate: perhaps an outbreak of fighting, the danger of bombing or compulsory
conscription, or a threat from a personal enemy; perhaps the search for work or
opportunities to trade, the need for medical treatment, or the undertaking of a
pilgrimage. My main aim here, however, is not to highlight these motives in
* The author is currently Senior Lecturer at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies
in Geneva. He is also a research associate at the Refugee Studies Centre (University of Oxford) and at the
Laboratoire d’anthropologie des institutions et des organisations sociales (CNRS-EHESS, Paris).
1 The data have been collected during several field researches in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Europe, North
America, Australia and New Zealand conducted since 1993 on Afghan transnational networks and migratory
strategies, in particular for a project entitled Beyond the Boundaries: Hazara Migratory Networks from
Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran toward Western Countries, supported by the MacArthur Foundation
(Chicago) between 2004 and 2006. It also draws upon a series of team studies carried out by the
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (Kabul) and funded by the UNHCR and the European
Commission (EC) for which the author worked as project adviser.
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a context of diffuse insecurity but to describe how transnational networks and
ongoing mobility are at the chore of the strategies developed by many Afghans.
A study of individual trajectories and family strategies shows that few Afghans
have never left their country since the Communist coup d’e´tat of 1978 and the
Soviet intervention of 1979, and also that many have returned at some point for
at least a short visit. The leaving and coming back has been constant.
While the Afghans have constituted the largest refugee population in the
1980s and 1990s, we are a long way from the figure of the victim compelled to
leave his or her homeland in the face of a towering threat, with the vague hope
of one day being able to return. Although migratory movements acquired an
unprecedented scale during the war, they have existed for a long time in one
form or another – and have remained in the memory of the members of many
Afghan communities. Nor do they necessarily have the traumatic significance
that is often attributed to them; individual mobility and the dispersion of
families or mutual support groups are not experienced as destructuring phenom-
ena in and of themselves. Seen through this prism, the concepts of “economic
migrant”, “political refugee”, “country of origin”, “host country”, “voluntary” or
“forced” migration, or even “return”, appear singularly reductionist in the
Afghan context. All these categories overlap with a combined presence of poli-
tical, cultural, economic and ecological factors.
Based on ethnographic evidences, the present article will propose three main
theses: the normality of movements and the prior existence of transnational
networks in the region; the resilience and inventiveness of the Afghan popula-
tion, especially illustrated by the remittance system; the relevance of migratory
movements and of transnational networks for the reconstruction of Afghanistan
(for both economy and social life). My intention is to contrast these migratory
strategies with the three solutions to the problem of the refugees promoted by
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): voluntary
repatriation in the country of origin; integration in the host country; resettle-
ment in a third country. They are based on the idea that solutions are found
when movements stop. But mobility may be seen as a key livelihood strategy.
Policywise, a more comprehensive solution is needed, which takes into account
the full range of strategies and responses developed by the Afghan population,
including the back-and-forth movements between Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran
and beyond.2
Through the action of the Afghanistan Comprehensive Solution Unit
(ACSU), the UNHCR had become progressively aware of the necessity to
develop a new paradigm supplementing the historical mandate of protection
and assistance.3 Such a perspective reflects both a changing political context
2 See E. Stigter and A. Monsutti, Transnational Networks: Recognising a Regional Reality, Kabul, Afghanistan
Research and Evaluation Unit, 2005.
3 Such an evolution is clearly visible in internal documents like Towards a Comprehensive Solution for
Displacement from Afghanistan, Geneva, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (Discussion
Paper), 2003, and Afghanistan: Challenges to Return, Geneva, United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, 2004.
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(with the Soviet withdrawal and the end of the Cold War, the subsequent conflict
between factions, the rise and fall of the Taliban and the establishment of a
government backed by the international community in Kabul) and a progressive
learning from social realities (mobility as an asset and not only as a problem).
2. Beyond the unprecedented wave of return
Migration is part of the Afghan social and cultural landscape. Seasonal move-
ments of nomads who bring their herds to better pasture lands, but who take the
opportunity to trade with sedentary farmers; mountain people who go to urban
centres or to lowlands in order to find any menial job; and pilgrims, soldiers or
refugees, Afghans have had a long history of migration in its various forms.
The war which has torn apart Afghanistan after the Communist coup of
April 1978 and the Soviet invasion of 1979 has nevertheless given a more
dramatic and massive dimension to those movements of populations. At the
beginning of the 1990s Afghans formed the most numerous refugee group in
the world, accounting for nearly half the total falling under the mandate of the
UNHCR.4 In 1990 a peak of 6.22 million Afghan refugees was reached. Large
numbers returned after the Soviet withdrawal (1989) and the capture of Kabul
by resistance forces (1992), but over the following years this trend was partially
reversed as more outward flows accompanied the new outbreaks of fighting,
especially in the Mazar-e-Sharif and Kabul regions.
The attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon in September
2001 and the subsequent intervention of an international coalition led by
American forces, bringing about the fall of the Taliban in late 2001 and the
establishment of a government in Kabul backed by the international community
in winter 2001–2002, set the stage for a new era filled with hope for peace and
prosperity. The prospect of a restoration of normality has caused an unprece-
dented wave of repatriation. According to official figures, more than five million
Afghans have returned to their country either with the assistance of the UNHCR
or spontaneously, mostly from Pakistan and Iran. Another half million internally
displaced people have regained their village of origin. Afghanistan has been one
of the largest repatriation campaigns in the history of the UN agency.
But following a new deterioration of the security situation, the pace of
repatriation has dropped since 2005. Afghanistan continued to be the leading
country of origin of refugees with approximately three million people of Afghan
descent living between Pakistan and Iran. Even without including 1.3 million
Afghans living outside the camps, Pakistan is still the asylum country with the
single largest number of refugees worldwide, followed by Iran. By the end of
2006, both countries together hosted 20 per cent of the world’s refugee popula-
tion.5 Many of the remaining Afghans have been living outside their country of
4 R. Colville, “Afghan Refugees: Is International Support Draining Away After Two Decades in Exile?,” Refuge,
Vol. 17, 1998, 6.
5 2006 Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum-seekers, Returnees, Internally Displaced and Stateless Persons, Geneva,
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 6–7.
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origin for more than two decades and more than 50 per cent were born abroad.
The UNHCR acknowledges that they have become used to different living
conditions and that many originate from areas currently affected by insecurity
and poverty. Voluntary repatriation, which takes place within the framework
of the tripartite agreements signed by UNHCR and the Governments of
Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran, is nevertheless still considered to be the preferred
durable solution.6
The level of repatriation initially showed a degree of confidence in the
renascent state, but also reflected expectations created by donor pledges to
rebuild the country and the deterioration of living conditions in the places of
refuge. To a certain degree, it had also been affected by the Iranian and Pakistani
authorities increasingly implementing policies to encourage Afghans to return
home. The sustainability of such a large return movement has been questioned
by many. Turton and Marsden,7 for instance, assess the repatriation operation,
reintegration opportunities, and the role and interests of the international com-
munity. They stress the fact that many registered returnees may be “recyclers”,
repatriating to Afghanistan, getting the assistance package and then going back
to Pakistan or Iran. Some others may be seasonal migrants with no intention
of staying in Afghanistan on a long-term basis. They also drew attention to the
difficulties returnees faced in resettling leading to a “backflow” of returnees to
Iran and Pakistan and further movement within Afghanistan.
Return to Afghanistan does not necessarily mean the end of displacements
and may prompt onward passage, following a pattern of multidirectional cross-
border movements. Channels of pre-established transnational networks exist
between Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran, as the movement of individuals to
seek work, to escape drought or to flee war has been a common experience in
the whole region. Despite the high levels of repatriation, the number of Afghans
living abroad is still considerable. Families and individuals continue to move,
and it seems unlikely that the back-and-forth movements will stop while they
constitute a key livelihoods strategy. Many Afghans have been shifting from one
place to the next for years – some never returning to their place of origin, others
only on a temporary basis before deciding to return into Iran, Pakistan or further
afield. Young men in particular, who have not travelled before, are still choosing
to leave Afghanistan – suggesting that displacement is not only caused by
conflict.8
With the passing of time, the Afghans have woven very efficient migratory
networks based on back and forth movements and the dispersion of the members
6 See www.unhcr.org (last visited 30 October 2007).
7 D. Turton and P. Marsden, Taking Refugees for a Ride? The Politics of Refugee Return to Afghanistan, Kabul,
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2002.
8 For young Hazara male migrants for instance, migration between the mountains of Central Afghanistan and
the cities of Iran offers the opportunity to broaden their social networks beyond narrow kinship and
neighbourhood ties. It may be conceived as a necessary stage in their existence, a rite of passage to adulthood
and a step toward manhood. See A. Monsutti, “Migration as a Rite of Passage: Young Afghans Building
Masculinity and Adulthood in Iran”, Iranian Studies, Vol. 40, April 2007, 167–85.
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of the kin groups between Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan and beyond. After many
years, the migratory movements are highly organized, and the transnational
networks became a major, even constitutive, element in the social, cultural
and economic life of Afghans. One of the most striking aspects of this migration
is the huge flow of capital that it draws towards Afghanistan. Once they are in
Pakistan, in Iran or elsewhere, the Afghans have to solve the technical problem of
sending money they have saved to their family in Afghanistan. Official channels
became progressively available after 2002, but the problem was especially acute
in the 1980s and 1990s, when no banks were operational.
Migration to Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries, and the very significant
sum of remittances sent home, can be seen not only as a response to war and
insecurity, but also as an efficient economic strategy for households and a crucial
contribution to the economy of the country as a whole. There is a clear pattern
of multidirectional cross-border movements that indicates the ongoing, cyclical
nature of migration – blurring the boundaries between refugees and voluntary
migrants.9
3. Refugee motivations and vintages
Several authors have argued that a typology is integral to any general theory
of migration and refugee displacement. Migration tends then to be conceived
through the lens of motivations, forced migration being a specific, somehow
extreme, case where the agency is minimal. Kunz, for instance, starts with the
following definition of the refugee: “With a different past and with motivations
at variance with those affecting voluntary migrants, the refugee moves from his
homeland to the country of his settlement against his will. He is a distinct social
type”,10 whose aim is one day to rediscover community ties by returning to his
homeland. Kunz’s central distinction is between voluntary and involuntary
migration (characterized by push and pull factors, respectively) and he uses a
classical decision model to identify the diverse combinations of motives and
external circumstances. Thus, he speaks of “anticipatory refugee movement”,
where refugees move to the host country in anticipation of a worsening situation
at home, and “acute refugee movement”, where they flee, often in difficult con-
ditions, a context of violence and insecurity. In both cases, it is true, “push
9 On those questions, see A. Monsutti, “Cooperation, Remittances, and Kinship among the Hazaras”, Iranian
Studies, Vol. 37, 2004, 219–40; War and Migration: Social Networks and Economic Strategies of the Hazaras of
Afghanistan, New York & London, Routledge, 2005; and E. Stigter and A. Monsutti, Transnational
Networks, op. cit. See also M. J. Hanifi, “Anthropology and the Representations of Recent Migrations
from Afghanistan”, in E. M. Godziak and D. J. Shandy (eds), Rethinking Refuge and Displacement:
Selected Papers on Refugees and Immigrants, Vol. 8, Arlington, American Anthropological Association,
2000, 291–321. This author considers in a historical perspective the political economy of the whole
region of which Afghanistan is a part. He argues that all the Afghans who left their country in the 1980s
and 1990s cannot be univocally labelled as refugees, as they have followed ancient patterns of economic
migration.
10 E. F. Kunz, “The Refugee in Flight: Kinetic Models and Forms of Displacement”, International Migration
Review, Vol. 7, 1973, 130; see also E. F. Kunz, “Exile and Resettlement: Refugee Theory”, International
Migration Review, Vol. 15, 1981, 42–51.
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factors” are the decisive ones, but the urgency gives them much greater promi-
nence in “acute movement”. Pull factors may then often play a role in the choice
of an (at least temporary) host country.
Inspired by such a model, Connor11 focuses on the many Afghans who
settled outside the refugee villages within the urban fabric of Pakistan. Her work
on the “self-settled refugees” in Peshawar starts from the assumption that choice
of residence is influenced by the refugee’s past history and cultural framework,
including geographical and ethnic origin, social position (educational level,
occupational experience) and political involvement (membership of a resistance
movement), time of departure from Afghanistan, and reasons for the decision.
Connor seeks to close the gap between studies of voluntary migrants and refu-
gees, and to move beyond the idea that the route taken by the latter is always
“forced, chaotic, generally terror-stricken”. Following Kunz, she argues that a
general theory of refugees must formulate causal typologies and include the
notion that different “vintages” of refugees share a number of distinct character-
istics.12 She shows that Afghans left their country after events related in some
way to their own particular sociology; they did not flee en masse.
The results of the research are expressed in percentages on the motivations
to migrate, correlated with the year of departure. After analysing the responses of
771 heads of families, she identifies ten reasons for the decision to leave
Afghanistan: fear for life (14.53 per cent) or livelihood (9.86 per cent) in the
wake of bombing and military hostilities; avoidance of conscription (23.48 per
cent); anti-Communism (12.06 per cent); recent imprisonment (8.82 per cent)
or fear of arrest (6.74 per cent); suspect family member (3.76 per cent); harass-
ment due to membership of a pro-Communist organization (2.98 per cent);
being in Pakistan at the time of the 1978 coup (0.91 per cent); other reasons
(1.82 per cent).
It is beyond question that each wave of refugee displacement can be differ-
entiated on the basis of the existing and potential threats faced by people at that
time, while correlations can be made between ethnic identity, gender and age.
Although, generally speaking, Afghans have fled from war, their reasons for
migration and the actual dynamics of this movement are much more nuanced.
The physical effects of war may be differentiated from the disruption of tradi-
tional livelihoods, the political and ethnic repercussion of war and the economic
fallout caused by war.
Connor admits that she pays greater attention to what Afghans say than to
what they do. She spends little time on the religious dimension of a protest
exodus against the Communist government. Her conclusion, in which it is
certainly possible to follow her, is that Afghans left their country after events
11 See K. M. Connor, An Analysis of Residential Choice Among Self-Settled Afghan Refugees in Peshawar, Pakistan,
Lincoln & Omaha, University of Nebraska, 1987; “Rationales for the Movement of Afghan Refugees to
Peshawar”, in G. M. Farr and J. G. Merriam (eds), Afghan Resistance: The Politics of Survival, Boulder and
London, Westview Press, 1987, 151–90; “Factors in the Residential Choices of Self-Settled Afghan Refugees
in Peshawar, Pakistan”, International Migration Review, Vol. 23, 1989, 904–32.
12 K. Connor, “Rationales for the Movement of Afghan Refugees to Peshawar”, op. cit., 155.
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related in some way to their own particular sociology. Her mapping of Afghan
refugees in Peshawar is most interesting, but the significance of her information
on the reasons for departure from Afghanistan is open to some doubt. In fact, the
results are rather disappointing.
It comes as no surprise that the bombing and fighting, together with general
pressure from the Soviet army and the Communist government, were the main
reasons driving Afghans into exile (rural populations were more likely to suffer
bombing and massacre, whereas city dwellers had more to fear from wrongful
arrest). The percentages given by Connor do not take account of the inevitable
overlap in motives. Moreover, her chronological section focuses particularly on
the moment of departure; she does not notice that people have not stopped
moving while they arrived to Peshawar, says nothing about back and forth
movements, and takes no interest in refugee movements within a diachronic
perspective. She gives the impression that Afghans left at a precise moment and
for precise reasons, which might certainly have varied from person to person or
group to group but were unambiguous in each particular case, whereas in reality
the taking of decisions was an uninterrupted process.
Motivations and causes overlap. People may live Afghanistan for protection-
related reasons, but seek work in Iran or Pakistan. While abroad, they have the
chance to improve their income and access comparatively better medical facil-
ities, and in this time they reassess their priorities. The motivation to support the
household is often combined with more personal reasons such as, for young
men, the urge to seek new experiences or earn money to show that they can fulfil
their marital responsibilities.
Categorization by “date of departure” does not allow us to draw out
medium to long-term strategies. It was one thing to leave Afghanistan, and
another to choose not to return. In seeking to group refugees by “vintage”
and by social-cultural, status and ethnic factors,13 Connor neglects the planned
“multilocation” of the members of domestic units and kinship groups, as well as
the complementarity of places of residence and occupations. Driven by poverty
as much as by war, Afghans have been constantly on the move. They have woven
an intricate web of transnational relations, and it would be pointless to try to
specify the moment at which the decision to leave Afghanistan was taken.
Migration is also a way of spreading risk within a household (with more
than one son) or between household (of various brothers). It is a coping strategy
to cover basic needs and repay debts through remittances. The migration of
individual members of a household may allow for their family to stay in their
area of origin. For single migrant workers the availability of pre-established
transnational networks facilitates the migration and influences the place of des-
tination. Most Afghans living and working in Iran have brothers staying behind
with their parents in Afghanistan, and they see their migration as a coping
13 K. M. Connor, “Factors in the Residential Choices of Self-Settled Afghans Refugees in Peshawar, Pakistan”,
op. cit., 927–9.
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strategy that allows their family to receive remittances to pay for daily needs, and
to accumulate capital for investment in land and housing.
Factors which induce migration cannot be reduced to the explicit motiva-
tions of social actors. Furthermore, they are not necessarily the same as those
which perpetuate it. Migrants weave networks of contacts that make it easier to
move between different countries. Addressing the causes of migration does not
constitute a guarantee to bring it to an end, as the factors sustaining migratory
flows come to form more or less stable systems.
4. Transnational networks and social strategies
A recent and growing body of literature proposes a novel approach to migration
and mobility contrasting with typologies. Several scholars have applied the con-
cept of transnational social networks to the study of specific refugee groups.14
Without negating the specificity of refugees in legal terms or minimizing the
hardships they face, these authors borrow methodological and theoretical con-
cepts developed mainly for the study of labour migration. This approach stems
from the concern that refugees are not mere victims but people adapting to the
world system, using their social and cultural resource. Refugees and other types
of migrants share a number of social features, and individuals may belong to
several categories at a time or successively. Social networks almost always include
people who can be labelled as labour migrants or as refugee, and migratory
circuits are often multidirectional. This new trend is also influencing research
on Afghan refugees. A number of texts have been published on the Afghan
diaspora settled in Western countries15 and the networks existing between distant
locales and scattered people are increasingly studied.16 It appears that migratory
trajectories of Afghans are not definitive nor linear. It would be more accurate to
describe them as a series of multidirectional displacements. This phenomenon
14 See for instance N. Al-Ali, R. Black, Kh. Koser, “Refugees and Transnationalism: The Experience of
Bosnians and Eritreans in Europe”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 27, 2001, 615–34;
G. Chatelard, Iraqi Forced Migrants in Jordan: Conditions, Religious Networks, and the Smuggling Process,
Florence, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute (Working Papers
49), 2002; S. Shami, “Transnationalism and Refugee Studies: Rethinking Forced Migration and Identity
in the Middle East”, Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol. 9, 1996, 3–26.
15 P. Centlivres and M. Centlivres-Demont, “Exil et diaspora afghane en Suisse et en Europe”, Cahiers d’e´tudes
sur la Me´diterrane´e orientale et le monde turco-iranien, Vol. 30, 2000, 151–71; P. Centlivres, M. Centlivres-
Demont and T. Gehrig, “La diaspora afghane: le paradoxe apparent de l’identite´ et de l’inte´gration”, in
P. Centlivres and I. Girod (eds), Les de´fis migratoires: actes du colloque CLUSE, Neuchaˆtel 1998, Zurich,
Seismo, 2000, 272–8; P. A. Omidian, “Life Out of Context: Recording Afghan Refugees’ Stories”, in L. A.
Camino and R. M. Krulfeld (eds), Reconstructing Lives, Recapturing Meaning: Refugee Identity, Gender, and
Culture Change, Basel, Gordon and Breach Publishers, 1994, 151–78; P. A. Omidian and J. G. Lipson,
“Elderly Afghan refugees: traditions and transitions in Northern California”, in P. A. De Voe (ed.), Selected
Papers on Refugee Issues, Washington, DC, Committee on Refugee Issues (American Anthropological Issues),
1992, 27–39; A. C. Shalinsky, “Gender Issues in the Afghanistan Diaspora: Nadia’s Story”, Frontiers:
A Journal of Women Studies, Vol. 17, 1996, 102–23. There are other ongoing researches and further
publications are forthcoming, for instance by Angela Schlenkhoff and Ceri Oeppen on Afghans in the
UK and the United States.
16 See A. Monsutti, “Cooperation, Remittances, and Kinship among the Hazaras”, op. cit.; War and Migration,
op. cit. There is also a series of reports on transnational networks published by the Afghanistan Research and
Evaluation Unit (accessible on their homepage: www.areu.org.af ).
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has become an encompassing aspect of the Afghan way of life and it implies an
intense circulation of people and goods across international borders.
In order to describe the interplay of local and global forces and to understand
how the Afghan migrants are linked to the world system, three methods of obser-
vation and analysis seem relevant: an open and flexible use of the proven concept
of network; a focus on the production and distribution of commodities; multi-
sited ethnography and transnational studies. The concept of network has been
defined by Barnes more than 50 years ago in a very simple and still workable way:
The image I have is of a set of points some of which are joined by lines.
The points of the image are people, or sometimes groups, and the lines
indicate which people interact with each other. We can of course think of
the whole of social life as generating a network of this kind.17
It has been reformed and adapted to the globalization context by Hannerz,18
who has reduced the weight of individuals and attached considerably greater
scope to the strategies of groups such as households, lineages, neighbourhood
circles, or even tribal segments. E. Marx19 has established the usefulness of the
concept of network for understanding the experience of refugees whose social ties
are expanding in different locales. The study should not concentrate only on
permanent institutionalized relations, as passing ties also hold essential informa-
tion about social practices. In the Afghan case, this meant going beyond the
apparent weight of official kinship relations and ancestral, tribal or ethnic affilia-
tion, in order to bring out the actual relations of cooperation mobilized by the
people in a context of insecurity and mobility.
The focus on networks and people remains nevertheless insufficient. Studying
objects and their social meanings, and describing the production and distribution
of a set of services and commodities have proven to be a fruitful approach.
Exchanges do not only satisfy material needs, but produce and reproduce social
ties. The relation between commodity flows and social ties is then reciprocal.
These two cogent methodological devices are encompassed in the concept
of multi-sited ethnography defined by Marcus who talks of “tracking” strategies
and who proposes different ways to apply his program: “follow the people”,
“follow the thing”, “follow the metaphor”, “follow the plot, story, or allegory”,
“follow the life or biography”, and finally “follow the conflict”.20 As Rouse states
in his research on Mexican migration in the United States:
[T]hrough the continuous circulation of people, money, goods, and infor-
mation, the various settlements have become so closely woven together that,
17 J. A. Barnes, “Class and Committee in a Norwegian Island Parish”, Human Relations, Vol. 7, 1954, 43.
18 U. Hannerz, “The Global Ecumene as a Network of Networks”, in A. Kuper (ed.), Conceptualizing Society,
London, Routledge, 1992, 34–56.
19 E. Marx, “The Social World of Refugees: A Conceptual Framework”, Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol. 3, 1990,
189–203.
20 G. Marcus, “Ethnography in/of the World System: the Emergence of Multi-Sited Ethnography”, Annual
Review of Anthropology, Vol. 24, 1995, 94–117.
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in an important sense, they have come to constitute a single community
spread across a variety of sites, something I refer to as a “transnational
migrant circuit”.21
A research which follows such an agenda will bring other outputs than the
typological perspective which is about motivations and distinguishes vintages
among refugees and migrants. Here, the study does not focus on any one loca-
tion nor on the moment of departure, but considers – both diachronically and
synchronically – migratory circuit as a whole.
5. Multi-sited research on strategies
It seems then worth tracking the strategies in spite of reconstructing the motiva-
tions, asking how rather than why people migrate. Adopting such a perspective,
the fieldwork is not carried out within a bounded territory but following mobile
people. The limit of the social group which is studied is not defined at first. The
itinerary of an initially small number of persons and their effective social ties is
reconstructed step by step during the research.22
The effective relations of solidarity may be studied by describing three
complementary phenomena: first, the spatial mobility of individuals, their trans-
national routes and the migrant smuggling rings (travelling is risky, involves trust
relationships and implements common economic strategies); then, the transfer
of goods and money, and the trading activities across international borders;
finally, the circulation of information through visits, telephone, letters and
e-mail. This corresponds to the study of the way people, money and commod-
ities, and information circulate proposed by Rouse and it gives access to three
strategies: (1) How people travel? How do they cross fighting zones and inter-
national borders? (2) How people send their savings from abroad to their family
left home in Afghanistan? (3) How people communicate even if scattered and in
spite of the absence of any modern facility (telephone, postal service, etc.) in
Afghanistan?
In the first stage, the research has been conducted in Afghanistan, Pakistan
and Iran, the three different locations having their own advantages and
drawbacks.
1. The village of origin. Afghanistan is a devastated country. Insecurity and
poverty, the lack of schools and hospitals are all major handicaps. Yet it is
the homeland and many refugees have kept family ties and lands in
21 R. Rouse, “Mexican Migration and the Social Space of Postmodernism”, Diaspora, Vol. 1, 1991, 14.
22 Within such a theoretical framework, the empirical collection of data is a slow path. Qualitative methods are
mostly used, such as participant observation (living among people to gather unsolicited information),
unstructured interviewing, life histories and narratives of exile, genealogies and kinship charts, accounts of
the negotiations leading to marriages, detailed figures of the amount, frequency and destination of remit-
tances. The reliability of the data is established by cross-checking and comparing the collected information.
Their relevance is asserted through regularity (i.e. when information is given independently by different
people) and saturation (i.e. when no new information may be drawn from interviews or observation). See
A. Monsutti, “En suivant les re´seaux de Kaboul a` New York: quelques re´flexions me´thodologiques sur la
recherche ethnographiques parmi les migrants”, Ethnologies, Vol. 27, 2005, 33–53.
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Afghanistan. People live there among their own; the women, children
and old people are not isolated. This makes it possible for a lot of men to
leave their family when they go to Pakistan, to Iran or to the Arabian
Peninsula. The cost of living is low, at least in the countryside, even
though all manufactured goods have to be imported from Pakistan or
elsewhere.
2. The refugee camps and cities of Pakistan. In Pakistan, the Afghans were
able to move freely (at least in the 1980s and 1990s) but the professional
activities available to them were scarce. Some Afghans have obtained
a Pakistani identity card or even a passport. For instance, Quetta is
a central hub for the spatial identity and migratory networks of the
Hazaras. The city serves as a stopover, an assembly point and a place
of refuge. If expulsions are under way in Iran, or if there is major fighting
in Hazarajat, people know that there will always be a relative to welcome
them in Quetta. Trade flows and human movement in both directions
add up to an intense migratory continuum. On the other hand, the
capital of Pakistani Baluchistan does not offer many occupational
outlets.
3. Iranian urban centres (Tehran, Qom, Isfahan, Mashhad, etc.). Iran presents
a striking contrast with Pakistan. The labour market seems to offer more
possibilities but living conditions generally remain precarious. Since its
position on the international scene prevented Iran to receive the kind of
international aid that Pakistan allowed to be channelled to refugees,
proper camps have been very thin on the ground. It is quite easy to
find a relatively well-paid job (building industry, construction of roads,
quarry, agriculture, etc.) by drawing upon family or tribal networks, but
Afghans are mainly employed as unskilled workers and find that many
activities are forbidden to them, while the constant danger of expulsion,
harassment and police violence means that it is difficult for them to settle
with their family on a permanent basis.
A growing number of Afghans also went in Europe, North America or Australia.
In the 1980s and early 1990s, most of them were from upper and middle urban
classes. But many rural people found their way to the West during the time of
the Taliban. For instance, some Hazaras are now present in Washington, DC,
New York and New Jersey, where they are taxi drivers or are active in the catering
industry (several have a pushcart or even a fried chicken shop). Many others
preferred to go eastwards and tried their chance crossing illegally the sea between
Indonesia to Australia on small fishing boats.23
My travels from Pakistan to Afghanistan and Iran, from Europe to North
America, Australia and New Zealand allowed me to study worldwide some
transnational social networks. Contrary to the idea that people who are settled
in the Western countries and become acquainted with democracy and human
23 See A. Monsutti, “La migration afghane en Australie et en Nouvelle-Ze´lande”, Afghanistan Info, Vol. 61,
November 2007, 15–17.
68 Alessandro Monsutti
rights may play a mitigating role on conflict in their home country,24 the ethnic
faultlines are sometimes exacerbated in the wider Afghan diaspora, where pre-
vious agricultural and commercial complementarities disappear. Although the
Afghan migratory networks have acquired a transnational dimension, they seem
to divide along ethnic lines: Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks and others
rarely rub shoulders along the way. In both Afghanistan and the host countries,
competition among the various components of society has become more pro-
nounced. Forced migration has led to a process of urbanization and detri-
balization. It may foster a broader identity with reference to the Afghan
nation, but concrete existence is based on narrow social ties. There is a line of
tension between an abstract sense of Afghan-ness developed in exile while every-
day life tends to be fragmented by group of origin.
Too great a stress on the ethnic dimension does, however, mask the reality of
the solidarity networks, which are usually organized around infra-ethnic aspects
such as lineage, marital ties or residential proximity. Regional origin also often
carries greater weight than ethnic affiliation. People from Logar or Herat, for
example, may spend time together whether they are Pashtuns or Tajiks – and
the same is true of Uzbeks, Turkmens and Tajiks from the North of
Afghanistan. At the macrosocial level, several faultlines are especially visible: the
mistrust with which minority groups view Pashtuns, who themselves tend to feel
that their claims are insufficiently acknowledged by the Afghan authorities; and
probably more importantly the difference between urban and rural populations;
the tense relations between the Sunni majority and the Shiite minority; the wide
gap between Afghans who have lived in the West and those who have remained in
Afghanistan or neighbouring countries, the conflicts of interest between diaspora
elites and internal commanders. At the microsocial level, the really operational
solidarity groups are based on a set of overlapping criteria (kinship and residential
proximity, but also religious affiliation, educational level, and so on), which
cannot be simply reduced to the dimension of ethnicity, tribe or lineage.
6. Linking mobile people through money transfers25
Money transfers are a matter of interest for at least four reasons: (1) they reveal
the existence of social networks linking faraway places; (2) they are economically
important for the areas from which the migrants originate; (3) they sustain
migration as a strategy of domestic groups; and (4) they stimulate and orient
future movement, since migrants pass on information about the possibilities in
various regions.
24 The potential positive role of diasporas in conflict resolution and peace-building is often put forward in the
literature produced by humanitarian organizations and think tanks. See for instance P. Weiss Fagen,
M. N. Bump, Remittances in Conflict and Crises: How Remittances Sustain Livelihoods in War, Crises, and
Transitions to Peace, Washington, International Peace Academy, 2006.
25 For further description of the remittance system among the Afghans, see S. M. Maimbo, The Money
Exchange Dealers of Kabul: A Study of the Hawala System in Afghanistan, Washington, World Bank, 2003;
A. Monsutti, “Cooperation, Remittances, and Kinship among the Hazaras”, op. cit.; War and Migration,
op. cit., 173–205.
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In the 1990s, when an Afghan working in Iran (kaˆrgar) wished to send his
savings back to his family in Afghanistan, he could not use the official banking
system since he was unlikely to have any identification papers and, in any case,
the banking system was not operating in Afghanistan. He therefore entrusted his
money to a businessman specializing in informal remittances and known locally
as a hawaˆladaˆr (from the Arabic hawaˆla, “transfer” and by extension “letter of
credit, cheque”). Half-merchant, half-banker, his expertise in the transfer of
funds has kept money and goods flowing without interruption between Iran,
Pakistan and Afghanistan, a role that goes back a long way but acquired unpre-
cedented dimensions during the war. Both kaˆrgar and hawaˆladaˆr must belong to
the same lineage or come from the same valley. If the relationship was less close
than that, a middleman was needed.
The hawaˆladaˆr passed on a letter to his partners, stating the details of the
transaction and gave another one to the kaˆrgar, which he sent to his family in
Afghanistan via a friend going back home. The commission charged is very low
(most of the time less than 3 per cent), as the hawaˆladaˆr’s profit is earned from
the trade itself, and depends on how distant is the deadline for repayment and
how close the relationship is between the kaˆrgar and the hawaˆladaˆr. The hawaˆ-
ladaˆr might use this money to buy some merchandise (plastic shoes, shirts, cloth,
water coolers, etc.) and export them, or directly send the money through the
official banking system to Pakistan, where one of his partners (always a close
relative) retrieved the money. He used it to make a profit through currency
exchange and finally bought some goods (wheat, rice, cooking oil, sugar, tea,
but also shoes, cloth, cooking pots, etc.). He dispatched them by lorry to the
family village in Afghanistan, where a third partner ran a shop. The goods were
sold and the proceeds were used to reimburse the kaˆrgar’s family.
In the absence of any external guarantee from the State, an atmosphere of
trust was essential to ensure that the transaction was respected. Such trust could
only arise if the interaction occurred regularly and over a long period of time.
Members of each social and ethnic group dealt with members of other groups
only when strictly necessary, such as to cross borders or travel in hostile areas.
Despite the trauma of war and exile, the Afghans had thus managed to take
advantage of their geographic dispersion and the resulting economic diversifica-
tion by developing new transnational cooperation structures.
Beyond their economic dimension, money transfers play a crucial role in
producing and reproducing social relations despite the context of dispersion and
(very often) war. It is true that, in the Afghan case, the hawaˆla system would be
better if it included banking facilities to convert money into loan and investment
funds that could be used to rebuild infrastructure. Although the emigration of
young men may pose long-term problems for the reconstruction of Afghanistan,
it is still a survival strategy that has proved its effectiveness. The hawaˆla system
has enabled many families to feed themselves, whereas humanitarian aid mainly
focused on refugees during the Soviet occupation, then gradually dried up during
the 1990s before making a chaotic reappearance after the fall of the Taliban in
2001. International aid has certainly helped many Afghans to cope with periods
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of acute crisis, but the multiplication of rival NGOs and a lack of coordination
mean that the overall results have been often rather poor.26 Remittances through
the hawaˆla system are considerably larger, and much better distributed, than the
total sum of humanitarian aid.
We have seen that economic exchange and social ties may be conceived
in correlation. Often, commodities and people circulate in opposite directions.
It is precisely the case in the remittance system among the Afghan migrants,
which fulfils an essential role. It is a complex interlace of solidarity and competi-
tion, trust and mistrust, whose study enables us to understand how Afghan society
has not sunk into Hobbesian chaos despite war and migration. Dispersion and
mobility may be seen as an asset with a social, economic and political dimension.
7. Beyond the three solutions to the refugee problem
The migration of Afghans is neither definitive nor temporary; it is more appro-
priate to speak of recurrent multidirectional movement. Few Afghan refugees
never return after their initial departure, and there are few domestic units within
Afghanistan without at least one member abroad. Migration and exile are there-
fore not usually followed by integration into a host country or definitive return
to Afghanistan; movement is continual and eventually leads to the constitution
of a genuinely transnational community. Drawing upon the example of the
Hazaras, we have seen how the Afghans have established a “circulatory territory”,
to borrow an expression from Tarrius.27 By maintaining a certain dispersion of
family members, they take advantage of spatial and economic diversification at
the same time that they diminish the risks associated with insecurity and poverty.
Shifting away from a focus on the moment of departure and the motiva-
tions of refugees to leave their country of origin, the multi-sited study of ongoing
mobility and domestic strategies shed new light on one of the most massive
movement of people in the late twentieth century. Having initially followed the
same people in three places (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran) and then beyond
(Western countries), having studied the transnational networks (the movement
of people, of goods and money, and of information), I may base the three initial
claims on ethnographic evidences. First, the normality of movements and the
prior existence of transnational networks in the region. Second, the incredible
resilience and inventiveness of the Afghan population, who have largely relied
on themselves to face the most trying conditions in war and exile, especially
illustrated by the hawaˆla system. Finally, the relevance of migratory movements
and of transnational networks for the reconstruction of Afghanistan (for both
economy and social life: money, new skills, etc.).
26 See A. Donini, The Policies of Mercy: UN Coordination in Afghanistan, Mozambique, and Rwanda,
Providence, Watson Institute for International Studies, 1996.
27 A. Tarrius, “Territoires circulatoires des entrepreneurs commerciaux maghre´bins de Marseille: du commerce
communautaire aux re´seaux de l’e´conomie souterraine mondiale”, Journal des anthropologues, Vol. 59, 1995,
15–35.
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The present article is based on a research conducted since the mid-1990s,
after the end of the Cold War, and among a precise population. Nevertheless,
similar results could have been reached following the same methodological
approach in the 1980s and among other Afghan groups. The refugees are not
mere victims, they have social, economic and political assets that they are able to
mobilize. Mobility is one of them, blurring the boundary between the categories
of refugees and migrants: refugee camps were part of larger social networks
organized on a diversified repartition of tasks between members of domestic
units. Some people stayed behind in the place of origin for fighting or looking
after the fields; some went to the Afghan Refugee Villages in Pakistan and
received food rations and housing; some went further to Iran, Kuwait, the
United Arab Emirates or Saudi Arabia to earn a livelihood benefiting to the
whole dispersed family through the hawaˆla system.
Policy options regarding Afghan migration have generally been framed
within the “conflict–refugee” approach, which presumes that Afghan refugees
arrived in Pakistan or in Iran in order to escape from war, and that they will
return once the fighting is over. The research with a multi-sited perspective
breaks from this view by approaching the subject more broadly from the per-
spective of “transnational networks” and acknowledging the complexity of the
experience for the population of Afghanistan. The reasons for migration cannot
be reduced to exposure to armed conflict. While violence and insecurity pro-
vided the backdrop to migration from the late 1970s onwards, the precise ways
in which people were affected varied between individuals, families, social classes
and geographical origin. Furthermore, the decision to leave Afghanistan was not
unrelated to prior economic expectations about the destination and pre-existing
connections. It is common to observe complex patterns of movement, including
repeated departure and repatriation. Pre-existing social networks, which cannot
be reduced to kinship, tribe, ethnicity, religion or political affiliation, have been
critical in protecting, facilitating and sustaining Afghans on the move. Many
examples of people travelling back and forth between their place of origin in
Afghanistan, Pakistan or Iran have been documented, despite the fact that
Afghans have been, since late 2001 and the fall of the Taliban, increasingly
vulnerable to police harassment in their host countries.
The refugee perspective that informs the current policy paradigm is too
simple a framework to incorporate the multiple dimensions and complexity of
the Afghan migration experience. It is unrealistic to expect that a complete
cessation of all conflict and political uncertainty within Afghanistan will auto-
matically lead to the return of all people of Afghan origin who are currently
living in Pakistan and in Iran. It would be more accurate to see migration
between Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran as an ongoing historical phenomenon,
whose scale dramatically increased with war but which will continue, as it did
before, even in the absence of military and political crises. Such a dimension
could be acknowledged by regional governments in order to move away from the
present-day framework and to pay more attention to the actual strategies and
obstacles of Afghans.
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Afghan movement partially blurs the boundary between forced and volun-
tary migration, as the social strategies of people labelled as refugees and those of
economic migrants are often similar. Considering the fact that ongoing migra-
tion was an efficient survival strategy for so many people, that it may be seen as a
tool of reconstruction, and that it is a constitutive feature of Afghan social life,
there is a real necessity to look beyond the three solutions to the refugee prob-
lems usually recommended and promoted by UNHCR: voluntary repatriation
to the country of origin, integration in the host country or resettlement in a third
country. Such a formal framework is not sufficient for managing the present
situation, as it is based on the idea that solutions are found when populations’
movements come to an end. A more comprehensive solution based on an under-
standing of social practices and strategies developed by the people labelled as
refugees is necessary.
Based on its experience in the region and the evolution of the political
situation, the UNHCR itself is aware of the limitations of its own action and
has acknowledged the necessity of defining a new approach:
Return to Afghanistan is a much more complex challenge than previously
recognised. This is attributable not only to the challenges inside Afghanistan
but also to the changing nature of population movements and social and
economic shifts induced by protracted exile. . . . There have been three
major causes of population movements from Afghanistan – political conflict
and violence, natural disasters, and economic migration. Many Afghans
cross borders to look for seasonal employment, to trade, to access services,
and to maintain social and family connections. These networks may have
become a critical component in the livelihood systems of many Afghan
families, including returnees.28
The absorption capacity inside Afghanistan is limited, and the national economy
needs the inflow of cash and commodities financed by migrants. Full repatria-
tion is neither feasible nor desirable. Implemented at all costs, it could destabilize
the fragile equilibrium of the renascent Afghan State and have negative effects on
the neighbouring countries.
Even if the causes of migration are addressed to the greatest extent possible
in Afghanistan, and if the government of Kabul is gradually able to provide more
effective, authoritative and democratic guidance, migration will undoubtedly
continue because of population growth, the underdevelopment of the country,
persistent lack of rule of law, and potential natural disasters, as well as corre-
sponding demands of Pakistani and Iranian economies. As we have seen,
it would be naive to see in the pervasiveness of mobility and transnational net-
works the ideal breeding ground for national unity and peace-building in
Afghanistan. But it would be equally prejudicial to overlook the fact that it is
an important aspect of social strategies and may be a factor for the reconstruction
of Afghanistan and for the stability of the whole region.
28 UNHCR, Afghanistan: Challenges to Return, op. cit., 1.
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